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PEOPLE V. GRAVES

[Crim. No. 9318.

In Bank.

[64C.2d

Feb. 23, 1966.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, V. FRANK H.
GRAVES, JR., Defendant .and Appellant.
[la,lb] Criminal Law-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Otficers.-In a prosecution for forgery, defendant's handwriting
exemplars and statement that he had ohtained checks drawn
on nonexistent accounts from persons in connection with a
real estate transaction and did not know where the payor!!
could he located were admissible, though defendant was not
advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent, where the
statement and exemplars were obtained before his arrest and
the purpose of the inquiry about the checks was not to elicit
·incriminllting stlltements.
[2] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel: Evidence-AdmiIsions to Prosecuting Officers.-The rule excluding statements
obtained from an accused without first advising him of his
rights to counsel and to remain silent applies only when the
aecuslltory stage of a criminal investigation has been reached,
that is, when officers have arre;;te« a suspect and have under. taken a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements.
[3] ld. - Evidence - Admissions to Prosecuting Officers. - In a
prosecution for forgery, handwriting exemplars obtained froDl
defendant three or four days after his arrest and while he wall
in custody were admisl>ible, though he was not first advised ot
1Iil'; rights to counsel and to remain silent, where the police did
not elicit incriminating statements from defendant but only
requested and s£'eur£'d additional exemplars to make handwriting analy,;i,; easier. '1'he right to counsel during police interrogation was d{'signed to prevent coerced confessions, not to
protect defendant against revealing other incriminating evidence.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
l :ity and Ccunty of San Francisco and from an order denying

a new trial. Norman Elkington, Judge. Affirmed; appeal
f"om order dismissed.
Pr'osecutioll for forgery. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur.2d.
Criminal Law, § 309 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Criminal Law, § 448; [2] Criminal
Law, §§ 107, 448.
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[Sf C.Jd 208; 411 CaJ.Rptr. 386. 411 P.2d 1I4!

Frank H. Graves, Jr., in pro. per., and Richard A. Bancroft
for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien,
Derald E. Granberg and James T. Fousekis, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
.conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of
three counts of forgery. (Pen. Code, § 470.)
Defendant was charged with forging three checks drawn
on the Central Valley National Bank. The checks named
defendant as payee, and he admittedly endorsed and deposited them, one in his account in the First Western Bank and
the others in the Wells Fargo Bank. The Central Valley National Bank had no accounts in the names of the purported
makers.
After the checks were returned unpaid, agents of the First
Western and Wells Fargo Banks called on defendant at his
office. Defendant explained that he had received the checks
from three different persons in connection with a real estate
transaction and stated that he did not know where these men
could be located.
The bank agents then got in touch with Inspector Wiebe of
the San Francisco Police Department. At his suggestion the
agents and defendant met in the inspector's office. Defendant
repeated his explanation, and at Inspector Wiebe's request
wrote out two pages of handwriting exemplars, duplicating
everything written on the faces of the three checks. Inspector
Wiebe took defendant to the district attorncy's office, where he
again repeated his explanation. Defendant was then arrested.
The checks and the handwriting exemplars were turned
over to Criminologist Williams of the San Francisco Police
Department for examination. Three or four days later Williams asked Inspector Wiebe to obtain additional exemplars.
\villia,IDS testified at the trial that the original exemplars were
unsatisfactory because some of the writing on the checks was
handprinted, and the exemplars were mostly in script. At
Inspector Wiebe's request defendant, who was still in custody, wrote out three copies of each check on specimen check
forms. At no time was defendant advised of his right to
COUIlBel or of any other constitutional rights.
The handwriting exemplars were introduced into evidence,
and Williams testified that the handwriting on the faces of
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the forged checks matched the handwriting of People's Exhibit 16 (exemplars given before arrest) and People's Exhibit 17 (exemplars given after arrest). The exculpatory statements that defendant made before his arrest were also admitted
into evidence. TJ:tey were substantially consistent with his testimony. Defendant contends that both sets of exemplars and
the statements should have been excluded under Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ot. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], and
People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361].
.
[la] There is no merit in the contention that the exemplars and statements given before arrest should have been excluded. [2] The exclusionary rule of Escobedo and Dorado applies only when the accusatory stage has been reached,
that is, '" when the officers have arrested the suspect and the
officers have undertaken a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, ..• " (People v.
Stewart, 62 Ca1.2d 571, 577 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201,400 P.2d 97].)
[lb] Here defendant had not been arrested, and the purpose
of the inquiry was not to elicit incriminating statements. Inspector Wiebe learned the facts of the transaction for the first
time at thi~ conference. It was only after the questions had been
asked and answered and the exemplars given that the investigation focused on defendant and he was placed under arrest.
[3] The handwriting exemplars furnished after defendant had been in custody for three or four days were
also admissible. Inspector Wiebe did not elicit incriminating
statements from defendant but only requested and seoured
additional exemplars to make the handwriting analysis
easier. We need not decide whether defendant could have
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to make these exemplars. l The right to counsel during police
interrogation established in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, is designed to prevent the use of coercive practices to extort conlNot every aid that a defendant or suspect is required to give the
prosecution violates the privilege against self-incrimination. A defendant may be ordered to stand up in court for identification, or to try on
items of clothing. (Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 [31 S.Ct. 2, 54
L.Ed. 1021]; People v. Lopez, 60 Ca1.2d 223, 244 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384
P.2d 16].) Blood samples may be taken from a suspect without his consent,
if the means used to obtain them do not shock the conscience. (People
v. Duroncelay, 48 Ca1.2d 766, 770 [312 P.2d 690].) Although we have
found no case in which an unwilling defendant who has not waived the
privilege has been ordered to give handwriting exemplars, statements in
some California cases and the opinions of leading writers support the
position that the privilege is not applicable. (People v. Matteson, 61
Cal.2d 466, 469 [39 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161]; People v. Harper, 115
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fessions or other incriminating statements. (In re Lopez, 62
Ca1.2d 368, 372-373 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380].) It
does not protect a defendant from revealing evidence against
himself in other ways. It applies only when" the police carry
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements, ... " (Escobedo v. IUinois, 378 U.S.
478, 491 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977].) In Escobedo the
United States Supreme Court emphasized its concern with
the problem of using coercive methods to obtain confessions.
(378 U.S. at 490 [dissenting opinion by White, J., at pp. 498499].) It observed that ~y system of law enforcement that
places primary reliance on confessions may become not only
oppressive, but unreliable.
In Escobedo, the court found a remedy in the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel for the abuses it deemed inherent
in inquisitorial methods. There is nothing in the' language or
the logic of Escobedo, however, to indicate that this remedy is
needed if the police have not carried out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements. Accordingly, we find no support in Escobedo for invoking the
right to counsel to block scientific crime investigation. Reliance on handwriting exemplars for expert analysis is not a
substitute for thorough scientific investigation of crime but
an excellent example of such investigation.2 To preclude the
police from asking for such exemplars would foster reliance
instead on the very inquisitorial methods of law enforcement
that Escobedo deems suspect.
The judgment is affirmed and the purported appeal from
the nonappealable ot:der denying a new trial is dismissed.
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
PETERS, J.-I dissent.
I agree with the majority that the exemplars and statements given before arrest were admissible under Escobedo
and Dorado because the accusatory stage had not yet been
Cal.App.2d 776, 779 [252 P.2d 950]; People v. Gormley, 64 Cal.App.2d
SS6, SS8 [148 P.2d 687]; People v. Whitaker, 127 Cal.App. 370, S73
[15 P.2d 883] ; 8 Wigmore on Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2265;
McCormick on Evidence (1954) § 126.)
2' 'Handwriting identification is. based upon tbe principle that every
person's handwriting is distinctive. . • . The possibility tbat one person
eould imitate the handwriting of another and successfully deceive an
expert document examiner is very remote." (Report of The President 'I
Commission on tbe AIsa8sination of President Kennedy, pp. 567-568.)
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reached when they were secured. Defendant was not then in
custody and the investigation had not yet focused on him.
But, according to the expert, those exemplars were unsatisfactory because they were mostly in script, while the checks
upon which the charge was based were mostly handprinted,
At the request of the expert several new sets of exemplars were
then secured after arrest, and at the accusatory stage, without informing the defendant of his rights to counsel and to
remain silent. These exemplars were admitted into evidence
and constitute the main evidence of guilt. It is my opinion
that the admission of these exemplars was prejudicial error, and
requires reversal. I cannot agree with the majority that the
rights guaranteed by Escobedo and Dorado do not apply to
these exemplars admittedly secured after the accusatory
stage had been reached.
The majority reason that the right to counsel only applies
to the elicitation of statements from 'the defendant and not to
the elicitation of evidence in other forms. It is stated that
"The right to counsel during police interrogation established
in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, is designed to prevent the use
of coercive practices to extort confessions or other incriminating statements. [Citation.] It does not protect a defendant from
reveallng evidence against himself in other ways. " The majority
conclude, therefore, that it is unnecessary to reach the question whether handwriting exemplars fall within the privilege
against self-incrimination.
The limitation of Escobedo and Dorado to evidence given in~
the form of statements is, in my opinion, unsound. It is contrary to the very purpose upon which the right to counsel
during police interrogation at the accusatory stage is predicated.
The United States Supreme Court in Escobedo was primarily interested in preventing improper police tactics which
spawned involuntary confessions. It concluded that the presence of counsel would go far to eradicate such tactics. (In re
Lopez, 62 Ca1.2d 368, 372-373 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d
380].) But those coercive practices thus sought to be restricted are not limited to obtaining confessions in the form
of statements from an accused. There is no legal difference
between a defendant being coerced into obtaining for the
police documents or real evidence not otherwise obtainable by
legal process, and being coerced into giving incriminating
statements. There is no guarantee that coercive methods wiU
not be used by the police to obtain documents or chattels
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which are unobtainable by a search warrant because their
location is unknown and unobtainable by legal compulsion
because the use of such compulsion would violate the defendant's privilege against self-in~rimination. Coercion CHn also be
used to elicit incriminating conduct. In People v. Furnish, 63
Ca1.2d 511 [47 Cal. Rptr. 387, 407 P.2d 299], thc defendant
gave incriminating statements after the accusatory stage had
arisen and then went through a reenactment of the crime
where it took place. Movies were taken of the reenactment,
but we did not pass on their admissibility since th<>y were not
introduced into evidence. If the movies had been admitted.
we certainly could not conclude that because such evidence of
defendant's participation in the crime was not contained in
statements, it was admissible even though the defendant was
110t advised of his right to counsel and was persuaded to
perfom the reenactment by means of a process of interrogations
designed to elicit such evidence. That handwriting exemplars
may be coerced from a defendant in the same mann<>r as are
statements is clearly shown by People v. Matteson, 61 Ca1.2d
466 [39 Cal.Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161], wherein we held handwriting exemplars obtained by brutality to be inadmissible
under Rochin v. State of Cal1form'a, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct.
205,96 L.Ed. 183,25 A.L.R.2d 1396].
It is evident that coercive methods or other improper police
practices can be used to elicit incriminating evidence through
several other forms than through statements. In each case the
accused is persuaded to obtain or create evidence against
himself. The fact that such evidence is usually obtained
through statements, since this method requires the least
action on the part of the accused and hence the least amount
of persuasion, does not obviate the danger that coercive
methods will be used to ohtain evidence in other ways. On the
contrary, because the obtaining or creating of nonverbal evidence generally requires more active participation on the
part of the accused, there is a greater danger that coercive
methods will be used to obtain SUCll evidence. The right to
counsel matures when the accusatory stage arises. (Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 [84 S.Ct. ]758, 12 L.Ed.2d
9i7].) Since counsel would be no less valuable in preventing
cucrcioll of evidence in forms other than statements, I cannot
distinguish between the forms of incriminating evidence in
tlctermilling the rig-ht to counsel at this stage.
Once it is cOlleludf'd that the rules of Escobedo apply to
obtaining evidence from tlle defendant through other forms
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than through statements alone, it becomes necessary to d.etermine whether tIle particular form in which the evidence is
obtained falls within tIle privilege against self-incrimination.
This is the real key to the problem here involved. The right
to counsel serves no real purpose when a defendant is requested to give evidence which could be compelled by legal
process since the police do not then have the incentive to
resort to illegal methods of obtaining the evidence. Moreover,
advice of counsel to refuse giving evidence which is not within the privilege would be of little help if the defendant haa
no legal right to refuse.
The majority, without determining whether the privilege
against self-incrimination is applicable to handwriting exemplars, and relying primarily on People v. Matteson, supra, 61
Ca1.2d 466, strongly indicate that it is not. (Majority opinion, fn. t.) It should be mentioncd that Matteson did not
decide' the question because the exemplars there involved
werc held to be inadmissible under Roc1tin whether or not the
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable. (People
v. Matteson, Sll.pra, at p. 469.) We have recently recognized
that the question is an open one in this state. (People v.
Gilbert, 63 Ca1.2d 690, 708-709 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d
365).}
It is true, as the majority state, that not every aid that a
defendant or suspect is required to give the prosecution violates the privilege against self-incrimination. An accused can
be fingerprinted, photographed, and measured without his
consent; he may be ordered to stand up in court for identification or to tryon items of clothing; blood samples may be
taken from a suspect without his consent if the means used to
obtain them do not shock the conscience. (See Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245 [31 8.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021) ; People v. _____ _
Lopez, 60 Ca1.2d 223, 244 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16) ;
I
People v. Duroncelay, 48 Ca12d 766, 770 [312 P.2d 690).) In
tIle above cases, however, the evidence sought relates to the
physical characteristics of the defendant and is already in
existence. l It is universally conceded that one can rely on the
privilege in refusing to produce documents or cllattels in the
lIn People v. Atchley, 53 CnJ.2d ]60 [346 P.2d 764], the defendant
was required on eross,cx:lIllination t.o put on the shirt he hnd worn on
the night of the killing, to ~how how he had ('arried the gun, and to
demonstrate wit.h nn llssistant 11;« ,.j,.!. IIttCJrlwy his and llis wife'8 move.
ments during the struggl!'. We lIPid t.hat he had waived his privilege
against self·innilllin:,tion :is to lhC'sp. mnU!'I'S whc'lI he voluntarily raised
them on direct eaxmination. (53 C"l.2d at pp. ]73·174.)
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face of a subpoena or other legal process. (Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 [6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746]; 8
Wigmore on Evidence (McNaughton Rev. 1961) § 2264.)
There is a similarity between compelling a defendant to produce a document and compelling him to furnish a specimen
of his handwriting for in both cases the witness is required to
actively procure evidence against llimself which is not then
present. As stated by one court in dealing with handwriting
exemplars, "the present case is more serious than that of
compelling the production of documents or chattels, because
here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of
the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which
may identify him as the falsifier." (Beltram v. Samson
(1929) 53 Philippine 570, 577.) It would be a strange paradox if a defendant could successfully invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination in refusing to obtain existing samples of his handwriting, yet could be required to create similar samples by legal compulsion. Compelling a defendant to
create samples of his handwriting can certainly not be regarded as less objectionable than compelling him to obtain
samples already created. Since the samples can be used to
prove that the accused wrote the forged checks, they are as
much testimonial disclosures as are verbal admissions by the
accused that he is the falsifier.
It is also unreasonable to hold or to imply that the police,
without advising a defendant of his right to counsel, can
obtain handwriting exemplars at the accusatory stage which
show that he wrote the forged checks, when, admittedly, they
could not request his verbal admission that he wrote those
checks. A limitation of Escobedo to the elicitation of statements would encourage the police to obtain evidence from a
defendant in other forms which are within the privilege
against self-incrimination without advising him of his right
to counsel. Admission of such evidence must therefore be held
to constitute a violation of the right to counsel during the
accusatory stage as established in Escobedo.
The question remains whether the error in the present case
requires reversal. The evidence gained from the exemp1ars
must be regarded as admissions contained in attempted exPeople v. Lopez, supra, 60 Cal.2d 223, 244, contains dicta that a de·
fendant may be required to speak for voice identification, but, even if
this dicta were correct, there is 110 support for it in the cases cited as
authority for this proposition. (See People v. DU1'oncelay, supra, 48
Cal.2d 766; People v. Trujillo, 32 CaJ.2d 105 [194 P.2d 681].)
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culpatory statements since it cannot be assumed that defendant had any intention of confessing in view of his consistent
denials of having written the checks which brought about the
prosecution. The error in admitting the exemplars is therefore subject to the test of prejudice. (People v. HiUery, 62
Cal:2d 692,712 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].)
Under the People's theory of the case, the conviction of
defendant is based solely upon the premise that he was the
person who had filled ont the face of each of the three checks.
Defendant consistently denied this both before the· trial and
as a witness at the trial. There is no direct testimony to the
contrary. Obviously, the jury found that defendant had filled
out the checks in question. In so finding, the jury must have
relied upon and accepted the testimony of the expert that
defendant was the person who had done the writing on the
f;tce of the checks. AB already pointed out, the exemplars
properly obtained were unsatisfactory, and apparently insufficient to convict. The expert's opinion that defendant
wrote the checks must have been primarily based on the
second set of exemplars Hlegally obtained. This requires a
reversal because there is n.ot only a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained· of might have contributed to the
conviction (Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 [84 S.Ot.
229, 11 L.Ed2d 171]) but there is a reasonable probability
tIl at a result more favorable to the defendant· would have
been reached if the evidence illegally obtained had not been
erroneously admitted. (People v. WatsDn, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 837
[299 P.2d 243].)
I would reverse the judgment.
Peek, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 22,
1966. Peters, J., and Peek, J., were of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.

